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FOREWORD
This is one of a series of reports prepared for the California Commission on Government
established in the wake of Proposition 13 under the chairmanship of A. Alan Post.
which issued its report and recommendations in January 1979, was concerned with the general area of
state and local taxation and expenditure policies, the organization of state and local government, and with
the impact of Proposition 13 on all of these. More than 50 study projects were commissioned, most involving "task forces" of state and local officials, representatives of interest groups, and qualified specialists.
In response to a request from the Commission, the Institute of Governmental Studies undertook
four of the study projects under a research grant from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (Grant H-2944-G). Preliminary drafts of these reports were made available to the Commission in
from qualified persons,
late fall, at the same time as comments and further information were
and incorporated into these final versions. (See next page for further details.}
The Institute gratefuily acknowledges the support and cooperation of the Office of Policy Development and Research of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, as well as the members
staff of the Commission on Government Reform. We are pleased to have had the opportunity to contribute
to the work of the Commission and to those policymakers who must now wrestle with the
and
controversial issues posed by Proposition 13. These and parallel issues will dominate the domestic "'"''"'''-''"
of the nation during the 1980's. The need for objective analysis and informed judgments is criticaL These
reports, it is hoped, meet both tests.
Eugene C. Lee
Director
January 1979
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A Partial

Proposition 13 in the 1978 California

of Research in the State of Cali-

A Pre-Election

I.

BACKGROUND

Proposition 13 has lowered the annual costs of owning real
in California.

The larger is this cost reduction to the owner, the more

important the immediate consequences for

icular ownership decisions:

to buy, sell, or lease; to build a new building; to renovate or add to an
existing building.

At the same time, changes in

and, in some

cases, of the amount and quality of public services follow from
Proposition 13 and will also affect real-estate markets in various ways.
Real-estate decisions, many thousands

them, may have

macro-

consequences for the California economy and will affect
revenues

&~d

responsibilities.

there is wide

fie meanings of the new

as to the
as to the responses

to the new conditions that may be made

millions

thousands of business enterprises, and many hundreds or thousands of
governmental and public organizations.

(Relatively modest shifts of
cted

assumptions fed into a UCLA forecasting model

in California's rates of employment, unemployment, and total
income.)
For the purposes of this research

transfers are

transactions that shift control of real property from one economic unit
to another and are regarded as substantive property transfers within the
meaning of Proposition 13 and the 1978 implementing legislation.

An owner-

ship change registered with the Recorder of Deeds is a typical example; but the
Legislature, in Senate Bill 154 and Senate Bill 1212, excluded some transfers
from consideration on the ground that they were essentially technical.
spousal transfers and deed recordings to convey title of previous joint-

1

Inter-

2

tenancy property to the surviving spouse are two cases in point.

If these

nominal transactions had not been excluded, the property would have lost
"base year" treatment and a new assessment would be made as of the date
of the technical property transfer.
Our definition emphasizes change of control, not change of ownership,
because, for example, leases of more than ten years are included as property
transfers within the meaning of Proposition 13.

(See Senate Bill 154, sec. 29.)

Two not very surprising conclusions can be reported concerning what
has

ition 13 in the months since its

in response to

come

tax

First

the rules
the

action

difficult for decision-makers to absorb; and it has increased business
for

time.

Second,

the

fie

are confounded with many other forces and
market
market

Even when data become available from several
after

sage of

13,

real-estate
or years of
be very

difficult to distinguish from the effects of numerous other variables that
affect the volumes of property transfers, the amount of new construction,
and the prices of real property.
It is revealing, however, to analyze the reasons why uncertainty has
increased and indicate some temporary consequences of this uncertainty.
In addition, some elements of the market response to Proposition 13 can
be analyzed, and the constitutional validity and the potential use of
legal devices for property transfer can be discussed.
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It is of interest to observe of both the housing and other real-estate
real-estate assets is

markets that this decrease in the cost of hol
exrected

businessmen, other

to stimulate the real-

estate markets, both for exist
these

ru1d for new construction.

of assets becomes more attractive relative to
ion 13.

and relative to the situation before passage of
is, of course, that other
of which there was

asset types

do not remain the same.

ffsett

o
an

The high

in the first few

lL'1i versal

months after the June 1978 election arose from the
numbe

Yet the

a

turn

ces for exist

estate and the rates

fu1 ideal way to approach the evaluation of

new construction.

ition l3's

would be to begin from a fully defined econometric model of the market (say,
the hous

market) and inject the change in

cost into that model.

From this, the

assessment and tax
in values and the transaction

turnover rate could be calculated from the relationships in the model.

Also,

the model might permit calculation of the rate of convergence to full "
market

of

treatment of the whole stock of hous
It is not possible to follow this econometric approach either for

hous

or for non-housing real- estate.

consists of a series of efforts to clari
Proposition 13 by means of micro-economic

Therefore, our invest
elements of the

of

is.

Also, the research reported here was completed before
the Revenue Act of 1978.

ion

passed

This Act provides many owner-occupiers of resi-

dential property an exemption from tax on capital gains up to $100,000 on

sale of the principal residence.
taxpayer only once.

This privilege may be exercised by the

Other effects on the timing and character of property

transfer decisions may well be swamped in importance by the great size of
this tax reduction, but we have not sought to incorporate in this study the
effects of the new capital-gains treatment.

II.

PROPERTY TURNOVER RATES

Property turnover is important in the interpretation of Proposition 13
because a property transfer triggers reassessment as of the date of transfer
and therefore changes the property tax liability from "base year" treatment,
or the previous assessed valuation adjusted by two percent per year.

This,

in turn, changes the costs of holding that property as compared with the
costs prior to the transfer.

(In today's generally inflationary climate,

the assessment rises, and the tax liability and costs of property holding
also rise.

But it is quite conceivable that the transaction could take

place at a lower price than the fair market value upon which the assessed
value was based, thus resulting in a reduction of the property tax.)
Property turnover rates, therefore, must be used for future estimates
of the revenue from property taxes.

In particular, turnover rates offer

a signal of the extent to which base-year treatment is
fair market value as the basis of assessment.

by current

Therefore, the extent of

convergence of total property tax revenue in a county toward a level based
on current fair market value depends upon the turnover rate in that
(Of course, the average rate of property turnover does not tell the whole
story.

Some parcels of property may change hands repeateru_y while others

remain in the same continuous ownership indefinitely.

Thus, the nbase-year

treatment11 extending back to 1975 will never be eliminated completely from
a county assessor's rolls.)
Total

property~tax

revenue in a county will, under foreseeable economic

conditions, inevitably lag behind the tax yield based upon current fair market
valuation even if every parcel of real property changes hands at the average

5

6

turnover rate. /Proposition 13 provides for a 2% per year increase of
assessed value from the last previous assessment based upon a transaction.
Thus, if the average rate of price inflation for real property is greater
than 2% per year, each parcel is valued for assessment purposes at less
than the current year's fair market value most of the time.

It "catches up"

briefly when there is an ownership change,: and then it begins to lag behind
again in subsequent years.

The more frequently the property changes hands,

the smal:::.er is the reduction of property tax payments below each year's
current valuation.
from

to

Property turnover rates in California counties have
In this range the maximum valuation lag on a property

s between five and twelve years.

How

the reduction in tax yield to the

county and local governments will be, however, depends also upon the size
of the difference between the average annual rate of
real property and the allowable adjustment of

ce inflation in

per year.

2-1

illustrates this.

County by County Turnover Rates in California
Table 2-1 shows gross property turnover in each county of
for the three most recently available assessment years.
year runs from March 1 of a

fornia

(The assessment

year to February 28 of the year following,

as the data presented come from county assessors to the State Board of
Equalization as part of the standard workload reporting system.)

Table 2-1

shows substantial variation in gross property turnover between one year
and another for a given county.
county and another.

It also shows big differences between one

Finally, even though 1974-75 was a recession year and

1976-77 was a good year in real-estate markets, Table 2-1 does not show

7

Figure 2-1:

Lag in Assessed Value Behind Current Fair Market Value

Assessed
value of
a parcel
of real
property
($000 1 s)

2% annual increase

$50
2% annual increase

1975

1980

1985

T , T are transactions.
1
2
Shaded area denotes assessment lag.

1990

1995

Year
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Table 2-1:

Gross Property Turnover Rates, California Counties,
t
Selected Years
Mar. 1' 1974Feb. 28, 1975

Mar. 1, 1975Feb • 29, 1976

Mar. 1, 1976Feb. 28, 1977

Alameda

.135

• 141

.17l

Alpine

.183

.077

.139

Amador

.120

.143

.166

Butte

.163

.238

.203

Calaveras

.100

.092

.106

Colusa

.151

.188

.241

Contra Costa

.140

.130

.235

Del Norte

.290

.338

.185

El Dorado

.199

.200

.231

Fresno

.153

.192

.167

Glenn

.157

.140

.113

Humboldt

.188

.113

• 357

Imperial

.094

.102

.091

Inyo

.258

.236

.257

Kern

.122

.103

.138

Kings

.117

.097

.144

Lake

.158

.151

.134

Lassen

.234

.238

.143

Los Angeles

.137

.144

.163

Madera

.140

.113

.200

County

tState of California, State Board of Equalization, Assessors' Budgets
and Workloads Summaries, 1975-76, 1976-77, 1977-78 calendar years.
Property turnover rates for each of the 58 California counties were
calculated by dividing the total number of property transfers (for the
corresponding assessment years) by the number of secured roll units.
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Table 2-1 (cont'd)
County

Mar. 1, 1974Feb . 28, 1975

Mar. 1, 1975Feb. 29, 1976

Mar. 1, 1976Feb. 28, 1977

Marin

•187

.173

Mariposa

.138

.134

.215
.264

Mendocino

.099

.107

.124

Merced

.175

.154

.165

Modoc

.091

.234

.163

Mono

.142

.160

.189

Monterey

.146

.156

.178

Napa

.145

.190

.193

Nevada

.223

.219

.254

Orange

.248

.247

.213

Placer

.145

.142

.186

Plumas

.268

.282

.271

Riverside

.147

.143

.236

Sacramento

.151

.146

.209

San Benito

.123

.127

.164

San Bernadino

.156

.149

San Diego

.130
.148

.203

San Francisco

.174

.137
.126

.139

San Joaquin

.135

.143

.179

San Luis Obispo

.158

.183

.223

San Mateo

.117

.123

.155

Santa Barbara

.138

.111

.161

Santa Clara

.240

.233

.233

Santa Cruz

.165
.244

.150

.208

.241

.267

Shasta
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Table 2-1 (cont'd)
Mar. 1, 1974Feb. 28, 1975

Mar. 1, 1975Feb • 29, 1976

Mar. 1, 1976Feb. 28, 1977

Sierra

• 114

.137

.164

Siskiyou

.123

.114

.121

Solano

.153

.156

.141

Sonoma

.141

.150

.186

Stanislaus

.164

.178

.210

Sutter

.113

.123

.141

Tehama

.254

.292

.295

Trinity

.153

.124

.162

Tulare

.167

.179

Tuolumne

.121

.121

3

.220

County

Ventura
Yolo

.183

.193

.192

Yuba

.177

.179

.205

Average

.161

.165

.183
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indications of the presence of a well-defined cyclical tendency--for example,
to have low turnover in 1974-75 with steady increases thereafter.

The

statistical portrayal of overall property turnover, as shown in Table 2-1,
does imply that a great deal of data assemply and analytical work will be
required to arrive at an accurate interpretation of the influences on
turnover and the consequences of turnover.
The statistical presentation in Table 2-1 is based on available data
that were reported for workload calculations by county assessors to the
State Board of Equalization.

For each county, this is calculated by
on the nsecured

dividing the total number of
number of property transfers.
of

TI1ese are data

zation by county assessors.

into
to

The

total

State Board

turnover rates vary from

a low of 0.091 in Imperial County to a high of 0.357 in Humboldt
a remarkable range for such

gross statistic.

The statewide average of 0.183 for all
however, an interesting statistic.

in all counties is,

If this rate of

transfer is

maintained in future, the implication is that within five to six years,
turnover of

will have occurred.

some considerable number of real-estate

There may, of

, be

that remain in the same
Thus,

ownership and other parcels that have two or more

the implication of 100% turnover cannot be taken to mean that "base year"
treatment is eliminated entirely.
"Property transfers" as reported in these data, however, include many
more items than are covered by Proposition 13
lation enacted during June 1978.

~~d

in the implementing legis-

In future, the interpretation of property

turnover can be improved by obtaining measures that reflect an analytically
defined turnover concept.

First, it will be important to separate the
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measures of the number of parcels between housing, on the one hand, and
non-housing real-estate on the other, and to disaggregate further as
follows:

(1) in housing real estate:

single-family, one-to-four family

parcels, and five-or-more family parcels; and (2) in non-housing real estate:
industrial, agricultural, office, and commercial.

A uniform classification

for use by all counties would be needed; and prior to its adoption there
should be consultations with urban-planning officials, real estate economists,
financial-institution professionals, and other interested users of real-estate
data.
Four alternative concepts could also be considered for use on the
data of each property category.
of existing parcels,

For that category, let

S be the number

E be the number of sales made, and

C be the

number of new parcels created through subdivision and construction activity.
Then:

(1) E/S

is the turnover rate with no construction

(2) (E + C)/S

is the adjusted turnover on the pre-existing

number of parcels.
(3) (E + C)/(S + C)

is the adjusted turnover on the end-of-year

stock.
and

(4) (E + C + N)/(S + C - W)

is the fully adjusted turnover on

the fully corrected end-of-year stock, where

N is the

number of parcels created by subdivision but not built on,
and

W is the number of parcels withdrawn from the deed

register through property consolidations, government
condemnations, etc.
Table 2-1 is based on measures in accordance with concept (3).
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Concept (4) is the ideally satisfactory one, if the most comprehensive
view of overall turnover is needed.

For housing-market analysis, however,

housing economists sometimes wish to analyze the turnover on existing
property separately from the impact of newly built housing.

For this

purpose, then, they might wish to have for each housing category a separate
measure according to concept (1) for comparison with new construction in
that category.

The reason is that economic variables affect transactions

on existing houses differently from those on new buildings.
We will continue with exploratory investigation of variables correlated
with property turnover and of possible causal relationships.

Among the

variables under investigation as possible correlates of county turnover
rates are:

total population and population growth; employment; construction

activity, including both housing starts and dollar volume of non-residential
construction awards; retail sales.
One example of the differences in turnover rates for different categories
of property is shown in Table 2-2.

For calendar years 1976 and 1977, respec-

tively, single-family housing turnover was 13.9% and 14.1% in Santa Clara
County, a very active county in real-estate volume and new housing construction.

The same table shows turnover in property other than single-family

housing; for 1976 this rate was 9.5%, and for 1977, 8.7%.

Many particular

categories of business property--factory and office buildings, for example-are said to have still lower turnover rates.

There is good evidence to

substantiate the view that disaggregated data on the number of parcels and
on number of sales should be gathered for each county from now on, in order
to facilitate analysis.

14

Table 2-2:

Comparison of Single-family House Turnover Rate and Other
Property Turnover, Santa Clara County

1976

1977

1/1 - 1201

1/1 - 12/31

Number of Sales Transfers *

43,026

44,399

Number of Single-family Sales

37,229

39,113

86.5%

88%

Single-family Sales as

%of

all Sales

268,824

271,407

13.9%

14.1%

Number of All Other Real Property Sales

5,797

5,286

All Other Sales as % of All Sales

13.5%

12%

61,169

60,813

9.5%

8.7%

Number of Single-family Parcels
Single-family Sales as

%of

Parcels

Number of All Other Parcels
All Other Real Property Transfers as
% of Parcels

*Includes sales of existing properties and of new parcels by subdivision;
excludes quit-claim deeds and other technical transfers not qualifying as
property transfers under Proposition 13. State Board of Equalization tables
for the assessment year from 3/1/76 - 2/28/77 show 78,221 total property
transfers of all types.
Source:

Mr. Loren Leavitt, M.A.I., Chief Appraiser, Santa Clara County,
California.
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As a final note on the problems of statistics, it should be pointed out
that the statistics of real property diverge from the statistics of
in important

s.

For example, the number of hous

number of separately recorded ownerships; each multiis counted in housing statistics by the number of

rental structure
units it contains.

When a change in the rules of the real-estate game occurs, as has happened
in Proposition 13, there is creation of new real-property parcels and
ownerships through conversion of rental housing to condominiums.

We are not

yet sure how the statistics will reflect the conversion to cooperative
(stock) ownership, which also occurs.
We now turn to detailed consideration of turnover in residential
real property.
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Turnover of Owner-occupied Dwellings *
Since there is major interest in the effect of Proposition 13 on
the turnover rate of single-family homes, it would be useful to have solid
information on what that rate had been prior to the election and its change
in assessment practices.

Unfortunately, little data exists except for

partial counts of sales--through multiple listing services, for example.
What is lacking is the inventory base from which those sales came.

Another

frequently cited piece of information is the average life of a single-family
home loan, usually assumed to be about eight years; not all home purchases
are institutionally

fina~ced,

however, and loans may be refinanced for

reasons other than sale.
A recent regression study in Alameda County provides information which
may be more significant than a turnover rate per se, namely, that crosssectionally over census tracts the Census-based turnover rate was not significantly influenced by common socio-economic variables (family income, race,
family size, etc.), so that the best predictor of the turnover rate is, in
fact, the average turnover rate:

approximately ten percent per year.

Again,

this is a cross-sectional constant; there are undoubtedly seasonal and
cyclical fluctuations in the rate which remain to be described.
Owner-occupancy turnover rates can be calculated from the decennial
census.

Counts of owner-occupied dwellings on the enumeration date can be

compared with the number of homeowner households which moved in during the
15-month period preceding enumeration; the number of owner-occupied dwellings
constructed during that same 15-month period can be subtracted from both entries
in order to restrict the turnover rate to the existing inventory.

*Written by Wallace F. Smith.

With this
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adjustment and a correction for the 15-month period, estimated annual
homeowner turnover rates for California metropolitan areas in 1969-70
are as follows:

Anaheim-Santa Ana-Garden Grove

.13

Bakersfield

.08

Fresno

.07

Los Angeles-Long Beach

.07

Modesto

.08

Oxnard-Ventura

.11

Sacramento

.09

Salinas-Monterey

.08

San Bernadino-Riverside-Ontario

.10

San Diego

. 09

San Francisco-Oakland

• 07

San Jose

.08

Santa Barbara

• 09

Santa Rosa

• 09

Stockton

.06

Vallejo-Napa

. 08

all California metropolitan areas

.08

all California urbanized areas

.08

all California

• 08
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The 1975 Annual Housing Survey suggests possible explanations for
the variation in turnover among metropolitan areas, namely that lower rates
occur for central cities as opposed to suburban areas, for older housing
units, and for elderly homeowners as opposed to child-raising families.
The following rates were calculated from the 1975 Survey--which does not
permit the extraction of newly constructed units and so is not entirely
comparable to the 1970 information:

Central City

Not in
Central City

Total

San Francisco-Oakland SMSA
All owner-occupied units built

.07

.10

.09

built 1939 or earlier

.05

.06

.06

husband-wife households,
no non-relatives

.07

.10

.10

head age 65 or over

.01

.01

.01

.01

.04

.02

1-person household, age 65 plus

San Diego SMSA
All owner-occupied units

.12

built 1939 or earlier

.06

husband-wife households,
no non-relatives

.12

head age 65 or over

.05

1-person household, age 65 plus

.05

Sample sizes in the Annual Housing Survey are very small, and these
rates--particularly those for elderly households--have large standard errors.
Available home turnover data are inadequate for development of reasonably
robust model from which the impact on turnover of property tax changes could
be inferred.

Some insight into likely response can, however, be gained

from consideration of hypothetical but realistic homeowner options under
assessment practices and property tax rates pre- and post-Proposition 13.
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Effects of Reassessment on Sale of Owner-occupied Housing
Proposition 13 provides that property is to be assessed at its 1975-76
market value plus two percent per year so long as ownership remains unchanged.
A change of ownership means that assessed value is changed immediately to accord
with market value at that time (presumably as indicated by the price paid).
This means that a family desiring to change its dwelling--because of a
change in its job situation or family size, perhaps, or simply to upgrade
its housing--incurs a financial penalty in the form of stepped up property
tax liability.

Quite apart from legal questions arising from this provision

of Proposition 13 (which are treated in other portions of this study),
reassessment on sale might seem likely to discourage homeowner mobility.
If this effect were substantial, the replacement demand for housing might
be weakened and the level of new construction would fall.

Families would

be more likely to stay put, perhaps undertaking improvements in their
present homes rather than shopping for new ones.

How strong is this effect?

This question was put to a number of well-informed persons in the
California housing industry--real tors, mortgage lenders, builders and others.
The procedure was very informal, but the view was unanimous:

there is

pervasive uncertainty among buyers and sellers about how this
affect the housing market and strong judgmental belief on the

will
of

industry professionals that it will not prove to be significant.
Informed professionals are not able to cite housing turnover rates
per se; industry data in common use do not include such rates.

But home

sales indicators--numbers of listings and sales, trends in average prices
and in loan volumes--do not yet reflect any clear impact of Proposition 13
as of September 1978.

Most of these indicators were off somewhat during
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the spring of 1978 in comparison with the hyperactive preceding spring;
this could have reflected uncertainty about the upcoming Proposition 13
election, but the feeling is that it reflected other factors such as some
increase in the cost of mortgage money and substantial fall-off of specQlative/investor purchases of single-family homes.

The rate of increase in

average home prices sold through multiple listing was felt to be sharply
lower in the summer of 1978--probably generally under ten percent per year-than it had been in early 1977, approximating thirty percent in some areas,
but that decline had begun in mid 1977.
As for the direct impact of the reassessment rule on potential home
sellers and

feel that the generally lower

, informed

As soon
as one starts to put numbers on the relationship, however, it becomes obvious
that "it all

and other partly

rates of

on

subjective factors.
Table 2-3 carries out

a

hypothetical case in point.

family owned a home worth $50,000 in 1975 which

It assumes a

1978 had risen in value

(at ten percent per year) to $66,550; the family now contemplates selling
this home to purchase one valued at $90,000.

Under Proposition 13 what is

the property-tax effect of the move, and how will this effect change if the
move is deferred to 1983 or 1988?
The table assumes market values rise uniformly at ten percent per year,
and that pre-Proposition 13 tax rates are ten percent of assessed value.
Beyond these assumptions it merely employs assessment and tax formulas
written into law, including the homeowner exemption.

(However, income tax

consequences of changes in property-tax payments are not included.)
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Proposition 13 Effect on Hypothetical Homeowner's Decision

Table

to Move
1975

1978

Present Home-Market Value

$50,000

66,550

107,179

Assessed Value-Pre 13

10,750

14,888

,045

46,060
1,489

51,583
2,504

461

516

90,000

144,946

11

II

-Post 13
Property Tax -Pre 13
"

n

-Post 13
Value

Pre 13 Assessed Value
Post

1,075

Property Tax

20,

1988
Inc. 10%/year
M.V.x25%- 1,750
,680
4
577

3

A. V.

X

1%

Inc. 10%/year

34,487

2

'75M.V.+2%/yr. 7,000
A.V.xlO%

,609

M.V.
A.V.

5

- 1,
X

Post-13, Buy 1978
Assessed Value
Property Tax

83,000

92,367

102,

830

924

1,

A.V.

1,530

144,ooo + 2%Lr~ool
A.V. X 1%

Assessed Value
Property Tax

+

137,946
1,379

X

Assessed Value

- 1

Property Tax

A.V.

Tax Increase on Move
Pre-13

586

Post-13, Buy 1978

369

II

, Buy 1983

II

, Buy 1988

1%

945
408

1,521
450
953
1,687

X
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Acknowledging that

11

it depends" to a considerable extent on the appreciation

rate and pre-Proposition 13 tax rate assumed, as well as on the price gap
between the new and the existing home, Table 2-3 points toward three distinct
kinds of effects:
1.

Proposition 13 lowers the tax penalty for the family which wants to
upgrade its housing.

Pre-Proposition 13, the move in 1978 would raise

annual property taxes from $1,489 to $2,075, an increase of $586.
Under Proposition 13 the same move will raise taxes by only $369
($830 minus $461).
2.

Proposition 13 provides a tax incentive for moving to a better home
"now" rather than "later."

If the family upgrades to the better house

in 1978, the total property tax in 1983 is $924, which is $408 higher
than the old house would have had in property tax for 1983.
is postponed until

1983~

If the

the total tax on the new house in

that year is $1,379, or $863 more than if the old house had been retained.

3.

's reassessment

to

in" the

homeowner in the sense that when a sufficient number of years has
elapsed, the tax

for

than pre-Proposition

buyi~g

The

ion 13 than without it.

a better home is greater under
in

The hypothetical family which put off

its move to 1988 would then incur a tax
under

tax is greater under

rules, but

of $1,521 per year
with Proposition

in effect.

Of course the dollar difference may not seem great, particularly as it
is a

comparison and one which

enter into a decision

move.

other factors that may

The dollar penalty would also be at least

partly offset by the years of post-13 tax saving in the older house.
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The "lock-in" effect is clearest in the case of a family which must
move for reasons other than a desire to
job

example.

its hous

If this family sells its home in

and buys another for the same price, the Proposition

for

0

3 assessed value of

,060 to $59,550 and annual taxes go up from

its home rises from
to $596.

because of a

The new figure is well below the pre-Proposition 13 tax of $1,489,

however, and that is likely to color the thinking of people in the market
for some period of time.
interplay of factors involved in this comparison seems to justify
the apparent widespread uncertainty among homeowners about what Proposition
really means to them.

It is in fact a

complicated equation; the

absolute dollar amounts, however, seem too small to worry about.
certainly
from

to the
sionals.

That

subjective responses which were obtained

III.

PROPOSITION 13 AND THE CALIFORNIA HOUSING MARKET*

Homeowners - Basic Issues
Pending more definitive analysis of the Proposition 13 phenomenon,
it is reasonable to assume that California's 3.9 million homeowning households were a principal force encouraging introduction of the measure, and
that most homeowners voted for it.

Owners of rental property stood to

gain from reduction of property taxes, but this is not a numerous or
cohesive group.

Renter households could expect only indirect and partial

benefits from Proposition 13 at best.

But homeowners knew with certainty

what Proposition 13 would do for them immediately; based on 1976-77
estimates from the Legislative Analyst's office, the average homeowner
stood to gain $35.24 a month through the reduction in property taxes.

This

is 57 percent of the average monthly property tax cost to homeowners, $61.83.
Both monthly figures would have escalated by 1978-79, of course.
Is this amount of saving sufficient to change the market behavior of
homeowners, homebuyers, or homebuilders?

Will other

of Proposition 13--

the rule regarding reassessment upon sale, in particular--counteract these
effects?

Will the immediate benefits to homeowners be weakened, offset or

perhaps intensified by changes in the provision of local government services,
or by further fiscal reforms?
We can gain perspective on these questions by looking briefly at what
was happening to the California homeowner's situation in the few years
prior to Proposition 13.

Household incomes had been rising sharply, reflecting

not only general inflation but also a composite demographic factor of declining
birth rates and increased labor force participation by married women.

For

example, in Santa Clara County between 1970 and 1975 household income per

*Written

by Wallace F. Smith.
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capita had risen 50.4 percent, of which 22.5 percent was attributable to
this demographic factor and the remaining 27.9 percent reflected wage gains
including inflation (from Urban Land Institute Research Report #27).

Taken

together, these two effective demand factors explain most of the price
escalation of homes in California from 1970 to the present and help us
understand why the resale and construction markets during most of the period
have been strong despite the appearance that families were being priced out
of the homeowner market.

Certain families were indeed being priced out,

but they were being replaced by other households for which homeownership
might not have been considered a "normal" housing choice.
By informal estimates upwards of 80 percent of new homes in California
have been sold over the past four or five years to childless, two-income
households.

According to a study of demographic characteristics of house

purchasers for comparable four-bedroom houses in San Jose,
in 1968 were two-person employed households.

43% of the buyers

In 1976,

employed

households constituted 88% of house purchasers, and the household size
averaged 2.8 persons.

(See Urban Land Institute Research

"Effects of Regulation on Housing Costs:

Two Case Studies,"

#27,
, Table 9.)

Where husband and wife both work the traditional reason for wanting a
single-family home--to raise children--is absent.

Tax and investment

incentives, however, more than compensate for this; the single family home
is well suited to the tax needs of an employed couple unwittingly moving
into onerous personal income brackets, and also provides an excellent
inflation hedge for savings.
into the existing home market.

This demand pressure on new homes spilled over
As market values rose, home assessed values

followed, given the principles which assessors are required to follow and
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the improved techniques at their disposal for updating their single-family
dwelling rolls.

Tax rates did not fall in proportion, so property tax

burdens rose, not just for those who were buying new or existing houses, but
for all homeowners including those with single ineomes and fixed incomes.
Table 3-1 describes the situation of a hypothetical but generally
realistic fixed income homeowner between 1973 and 1978.

A retired

individual~

for example, would be likely to be living in a debt-free home worth more
than his or her current income would justify purchasing; property taxes
would be the principal housing cost, taking 8.25 percent of income in 1973.
Five years later, if home values increase at twelve percent per year (which
approximates reality), assessments are updated, property tax rates do not
fall, and the householder's money income remains fixed, property taxes take
15.87 percent of that income.

Inflation, together with rising taxes,

reduces non-housing purchasing power by almost 38 percent.

This person is

faced with a choice between homeownership and food, let alone the other good
things of life.

Any tax relief would be desperately desired.

Sufficient

tax relief would allow this person to remain in his or her home.

As elderly

people have less occasion to move (because of job changes or changing family
size), the threat of reassessment upon purchase of another dwelling would
have little meaning.
godsend.

For this person, Proposition 13 is a nearly unmitigated

In the example of Table 3-l

supposing market value had reached

$60,000 by 1975, the new property-tax expense in 1978 would be $1,020 per
year less.

Proposition 13 clearly helps these households stay where they

are, which in itself should cause the inventory turnover rate to fall.

In

the past five years, undoubtedly, many fixed-income households in California
were forced to sell their homes because of rising property values, assessments,
and taxes.
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Table 3-l:

Inflation and Property Tax Burden on Hypothetical
Fixed Income Homeowner

Harket Value of home

$40,000

$70,494

8.250

15,874

Property tax

825

1,587

Fixed income

10,000

10,000

Assessed Value

Property tax as percent
of income

8.25%

Income after property tax

9,175

8,413

9,

5'

Purchasing power (1973 $)

Loss of purchasing power
due to property tax and
inflation

12% appreciation rate
M.V.

X

.25 - 1,750

assume 10% rate

15.

3,449

assume

:::

8%

inflation rate

.6% of $9,175

Effect of Proposition 13:
suppose 1975 market value
of home - $60,000
then 1978 assessed value

=

a.'1d property tax

=

56,672

leaving for other living costs

9,433

an increase in 1978 $'s of

1,020

,000

X

(1.02) 3 -
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For other homeowning households the pre-Proposition 13 situation is
far less clear.

Property taxes are only a part of the fiscal burden on

homeowners which state-wide measures can deal with, about 40 percent of
the total of property, sales, and state income taxes paid by homeowners in
1976-77 (from Legislative Analyst study).

The combined impact of these

three taxes was moderately progressive, rising from about 8.5 percent of
income at the $10,000 to $20,000 income level, to just under 11 percent of
income when income was between $50,000 and $75,000.

In terms of household

income, the property- and sales-tax burdens were regressive; but this was
more than offset by the structure of state income-tax rates.
For households whose current income was at least keeping up with
inflation and whose home was appreciating faster than the general inflation
rate while property-tax rates were relatively stable or even falling, it is
not easy to see an a priori concern about property taxes per se.

Putti~g

the three major taxes together, however, and taking into account the combined
effect of inflation (even if incomes rise at the same rate), the progressive
structure of unindexed state income-tax rates, and the accelerated rise in
property values, we can construct a picture of the overall tax burden which
homeowners in 1976-77 might have forecast five years hence, by 1981-82.
Figure 3-1 traces the composite tax burden as a percent of income for three
situations--the actual pattern in 1976-77, the pattern which would exist in
1981-82 assuming 8 percent per year increase in incomes and in the consumer
price index and escalation of house prices at 12 percent per year without
reductions in property tax rates, and, finally, the 1981-82 situation adjusted
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for Jarvis-Gann's direct effects--i.e., lower property taxes.

11 The two

forecast lines thus assume real household income remains unchanged;
inflation and the tax system cause the proportion of income going for
these taxes to rise.
The pre-Proposition 13 projected escalation of tax burden is massive.
(If Federal income-tax burden were taken into account, the projection would
be still more alarming.

Since Proposition 13 affected only state fiscal

burdens, the role of the Federal income tax has been omitted from this
•
ana...1 ysls.

The homeowner in the $10,000 to $15,000 bracket (real,

)

8.7

income) who
taxes

of income for

in
years.

'

sales, and state income
in

could see

For the

,000

the

,000

burden increases from 10.2

to
itself

even with
into ever
increase

brackets.
house

and therefore

that tax still would account
three-tax
for the
12

tax, in the

the
about

The unindexed income-tax structure j
fference in the inflation rates

and

for houses.

tax
income class
class and
among all classes within
lower limit of the class. It is an arbi
mates the shifting that would be
with more
in this case slightly underestimates the upward shift in median income produced by an ~~nual rate of 8 percent. Tax burden percentages for the lowest
and highest classes are based on assumed midpoints and are consequently only
generally representative. Income-related tax-payment data were taken from
a study prepared by the Legislative Analysts Office in the Spring of 1978.
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Figure 3-1
Effects of Proposition 13 on Projected Tax Burden

~

California Homeowners

Assuming Real Income Unchanged 1976-77 to 1981-82
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The direct effect of Proposition 13 is to lower the whole structure of
tax burdens relative to what might have been
in 19

the structure exist

with

more progressive.

to the taxpayer while the structure becomes
between

L~e homeo~1er

8.

000 in

,000 and

income

, we have no

of income for these three taxes, will be
.·~~~

Proposition 13 (on the assumed inflation rates used here,

indexing measures).

That is better than the

~~d

before

burden which

.1

have been anticipated before Jarvis-Gann, but it is still an increase in
tax burden.
these

Tax relief did not arrive with

ections, secondary

of

income tax liability were not taken into account.

13 upon state and Federal
The benefit of Proposition

13 to homeowners is thus overstated.)
This exercise, however hypothetical, does seem to have two
implications for the prospective behavior of the homeowner market.
is that the complaint of the non-fixed-income owner is not
the

tax, but with the overall level of taxation

sense, it is not extravagance of local

One
with

In a very real

that consumes

s

real income so much as it is the progressive structure of state income (and
Federal) tax rates.

This would say that homeowners supporting

13

were not necessarily asking for wholesale reductions in the level or the cost
of local services.

Local services will still play a role in the decision to

select a home.
The second apparent implication is that without complete indexing of
state--and Federal--income tax rates, homeowning families are faced with
continued increases in their real fiscal burdens which may be at least partly
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offset by almost tax-free appreciation of their homes.

This is a time to

settle more firmly than ever into home-ownership or to attain it if one
can.

Although it is difficult to translate appreciating property into cash

flow to pay rising living and tax costs, that is the game toward which many
households are being pushed--just about the only game in town.

Proposition

13 encourages speculative holding and refinancing of real property,
particularly in the context of inflation and lagging reform of other taxes.
Figure 3-2 shows projected 1981-82 tax burdens with and without
Proposition l3's direct effect, in terms of current rather than real incomes.
a household with $35,000 income was paying 9.1 percent of that

In
for

~~A~o~~'',

$35,000 would be
percent with
with $
five years later,

sa~es,

and state income-taxes; in 1981-82 a family with

about 9.5

without Proposition

They are different families, however.
would have an income
an8

6.4
The

f more than $51,000

rate of increase.

an apparent across-the-board easing in tax burden
13, but that is

and

shows
from Proposition

misleading.

It should be noted that both Figures 3-l and 3-2 assume homeowners do
not move their
the increase in

of residence between 1976-77 and 1981-82, that is,
taxes post-Proposition 13 is limited to 2 percent

per year after first being reduced

57 percent of the initial level.

33

Figure 3-2
Projected Current Income Burden of Major California Taxes
on Homeowners, 1981-82, and Effects of Proposition 13
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16

14
1981-82 without Proposition 13
12 -

- :: :: 1976-77

10

/ - - - - - - 1981-82 with direct
effects

8

~

6

4
2

6o

0

Home-owner Income ($000)

Projected 1981-82 frequency distribution
of home-owners by income groups

30
20
10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

110

Home-owner Income ($000)
*Sum of property, sales, and state income taxes.

Source:

see text.
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Property Transfer Mechanisms
Because the great majority of owner-occupied housing changes hands
with the assistance of mortgage financing and of real-estate brokers and
title companies, the recording of a deed will surely continue as the
dominant form.

Contracts of sale have on occasion been used in the past,

however, for either of two purposes:
First, there was a recent flurry of interest in them as a means of
circumventing the "due-on-sale" clause that is standard in most mortgage
terms.

This clause enables the lender to force a new negotiation of mort-

gage terms rather than its acceptance, automatically, of assumption of the
outstanding mortgage by the new buyer.
In Tucker vs. Lassen Savings and Loan Association (1974), the California
Supreme Court invalidated enforcement of a due-on-sale clause when the property
was sold by land contract.

In Wellenkamp vs. Bank of America (1978), the same

court held that an institutional lender could not ordinarily enforce due-on-sale.
While brokers' associations have advocated use of a model contract of
sale, it does not seem likely that this alternative to outright ownership
transfer will become important in ordinary real-estate transactions.
A second way in which contracts of sale have been used is the conveyance
of property in inner-city, depressed areas, where the costs of property
transfer through deed recording and the problems of financing are historic
barriers to real-estate transactions.

There is deep objection among expert

observers of the real-estate market against the use of contracts of sale in
such situations; for the normal protections to both seller and buyer are not
available, title may be clouded, and other aspects of the transaction may
go wrong to the great disadvantage of the parties.
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The Diminished Lure of the Suburbs
Proposition 13 poses at least a

threat to further

of suburban infrastructure which could materi

reduce the incentive

opportunity for urban households to leave central cities.

This

aspect of Proposition 13, rather than the change in assessment
seems far more likely to cause a slowdown in the turnover rate of
owner-occupied housing.
The traditional U.S. urban property tax makes suburban expansion
essentially self-financing.

A new tract of houses may require a new fire

station, but it creates the locally controlled tax base to pay for that
fire station--its construction, equipment, and operation.

As the tract

fills, the fiscal base beneath a central-city fire station may weaken, but
the suburban community does not have to solve that problem.

Suburban

infrastructure will perforce be newer and probably more attractive than
that in the central city, thus adding to the pull which suburbs exert on
households and contributing to the rate of turnover and of replacement of
housing inventory.
Under Proposition 13, with its one percent limit on property taxes and
restricted growth of assessments, new suburban infrastructure is not likely
to be fiscally self-justifying.

State funds may be allocated to support new

infrastructure, but thus far no permanent assurances to that effect have
even been suggested by state government.

The automatic link between public

infrastructure expense and public revenue has been broken.

Suburban

communities, where most new single-family home construction takes place,
must henceforth be very cautious about approving or annexing developments.
Such communities can levy greatly enlarged permit fees as a partial means of
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recouping the loss of property tax base for new developments, and this
practice is apparently spreading very rapidly.
with an interesting dilemma:

It presents developers

if they contest the increases in fees (on

grounds that they are new taxes and thus prohibited by Proposition 13},
they could force communities to suspend development permits altogether.
The removal of public-school costs from the local property-tax as
a result of Proposition 13 is welcomed by some real-estate brokers and
developers--perhaps a majority.

If there was one element in the pre-

Proposition 13 fiscal equation which tended to make

developments

unattractive to the community, it was the fact or belief that school expansion
tended to raise average school costs and hence to increase taxes for present
residents.

Now the community need not concern itself about increased

school costs.
~~d

The remaining tax levy in addition to new-development fees

user fees may cover the

public infrastructure and service

costs, with a net improvement in the developer's fiscal impact argument for
permits in some cases.
What has happened since the passage of Proposition l

The fact is

that significant other factors enter in, as well as the considerable lag
between local approvals and construction, to obscure the impact of Proposition 13 on single-family home construction.

Interest rates rose percep-

tibly in late spring 1978; on the other hand, there was a spurt of starts in
June to avoid new energy requirements which took effect in July.

By mid-

summer, starts seemed somewhat low, but industry professionals did not
attribute this to Proposition

Indeed, it seems reasonable to suppose

that there remains an inventory of serviced land which can keep construction
going--perhaps at a modest level--while state government develops longer-run
systems for channelling suburban tax revenues back to the support of
suburban functions.
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The Rental Market
Owners of rental housing stood to benefit significantly from lowering
of the property tax rate through Proposition 13.

From data developed by

the Legislative Analyst's office, it appears that for 1976-77 twenty-four
percent of gross rental income in such properties was going to pay property
taxes.

Given the normal leveraging of ownership, a reduction of nearly

sixty percent in this expense would materially improve cash flow.

Even

allowing for the increase in income-tax liability of owners, this change
in the economics of owning might have been expected to stimulate investment
in and construction of rental housing.
It begins to appear that Proposition 13 has made the rental-housing
investment climate worse instead of better--based on conversations with
informed professionals.

The reason is that rent control has become far

more likely--at some level and in some form--because of tenant complaints
that they did not share in the benefits of Proposition 13 as many clearly
expected they would.

The issue is intensely political, but there is a

perceptible effect upon the market; owners are described as "wanting out. 11
Conversion to condominiums or cooperatives has become even more attractive
for these investors.
There may thus be a short-lived and aberrant

in the sale of

residential rental properties as investors attempt to
holdings.

The reassessment-on-sale provision of Proposit

seem likely to be a material consideration in these sales.
California rental property assessed values appear based

these
13 does not

as
on gross

income multipliers, it is far from clear which way typical assessed values
are headed.
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Among California's renter households, the percentage of income going
for rent decreases as income rises, but the proportion of that rent which
is accounted for by property taxes is virtually constant across income
levels (from 1976-77 data in Legislative Analyst office report).
Table 3-2.)

(See

Thus, if landlords were forced to return their Proposition 13

windfall to tenants, the effect would be a greater proportional benefit
for low-income tenants than for high-income tenants.
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Table 3-2:

Rent and

Taxes in Relation

Total

n.a.

Under $5,000

26.9%

n.a.

$5,000- 7,500

16.2

30%

7,500- 10,000

14.7

23

,000

22.4

18

15,000 - 20,000

11.1

14

20,000 - 25,000

4.7

13

25

25,000 - 30,000

1.9

12

25

,000 - 50,000

1.6

25

,000 & over

0.5

9
n. a.

10,000 -
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IV.

PROPOSITION 13 AND NON-RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE

Owners of business real property will benefit from both the "base year"
treatment (1975-76 fair market value as basis for assessment of property
under continuous same ownership) and the one percent maximum of property
tax on current fair market value.
"Base-year" benefits to business owners will be particularly large,
of course, wherever a sharp escalation in actual economic value has occurred
since 1975-76.
1.

Here are examples:

Oil in the ground, or coal reserves, which may have already ballooned
in value since the base year and

it may be argued, qualify for

base-year valuation plus two percent per year;
2.

11

Improvements" that have low cost when made, but increase markedly in

economic

with the passage of a few years.

by the State Board of
presumably, vineyards).

An

given

is the treatment of orchards (and,
When young trees are

low cost per unit as property

they have

After five to seven years,

they reach peak economic productivity, but assessed value is based upon
fair market value (presumably, close to the installed cost) at the
time of planting, plus two percent per year compounded.

Thus, the

orchard is taxed on a grossly understated basis for the years of peak
productivity.
Then ensues an irony:

Proposition

as passed in June 1978 contains

no mechanism, according to the State Board of Equalization, for reducing
assessed valuation when the economic value of real property falls, as indeed
it can.

In the orchard case, the declining value of older trees cannot be

reflected in decreased property tax; on the contrary, the clock keeps ticking
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at a two percent per year increase in adjusted fair market value and thus
in assessed value.

Because the reduced productivity of old trees cannot

be recognized in lower taxation, the orchard operator is rationally obliged
to pull out the old trees sooner than he otherwise would and replace
them with new planting.

The one-percent limit on property tax does decrease

the property-tax costs of holding the asset by approximately 57%, as
against the pre-Proposition 13 situation, a factor which gives the orchard
owner incentives to hold the old trees longer.
of the two factors.

Figure 4-l shows the effects

Here, the investment cost of the tree is assumed to be

annualized as an interest and amortization charge.

The economic life of

the tree is shortened from B years to A years because property tax cannot
be adjusted downward when the net operating income of the tree falls in the
later years.
The size of the benefit of base-year treatment will grow at a
rate over time if market values of business real

two

per year.

more than

grow

Suppose, for example, that market valuation grows for

ten years at the recent general inflation rate of

The

sian for two percent per year escalation is six

the

less,

net differential grows by approximately six percent per year
the end of the tenth year, each dollar of base-year value,
will have grown to $2.1589.

at

Assessed value will have grown to $1.2190.

differential is $0.9399, and the tax paid (at the one

8%
The

tax level)

through "base year" treatment is only 56% of what would be

at one

percent of the tenth-year fair market value in this example.
Base-year treatment is preserved by maintaining continuous

sa~e

The example shows that advantageous tax treatment will grow to substantial
proportions over time, and the incentive to preserve it will become greater
and greater.
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Figure 4-1
Economic Life of a Tree Having Varying Produetivity over Time

annual
revenue
and costs
per tree

"old" property
tax

net
operating

interest and
amortization

A

B

age o:r tree

*annual net operating income

= total

revenue per tree minus labor
and materials costs of maintenance
and harvesting.
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Types of Business Property Transactions
Business entities can arrange any of a wide variety of real-estate
instrumentalities (corporation,

transactions, including choice of the

nominee, etc.) to act

corporate subsidiary, limited partnership,
as seller

&~d

as buyer, and the choice, also, of contractual device:

straight ownership transfer;
contract of sale, etc.

conventional leasehold; sale and lease back;

(See Maisel and Roulac, 1976.)

Timing and charac-

teristics of these business real-estate transactions have long been influenced
by tax considerations.

The influence of Proposition 13 is only one such

case in point and, very possibly, not the most significant.

(For example,

the U.S. Congress is considering extensive reductions in the
tax; if these become law, they may outweigh in significance for transactionmaking the reduced annual payment
In order to preserve "base-year"

as

owners of real property will need to avoid
in

ition 13 and in Senate Bill

+-~oaxavlOn.
+ •
)

of

sment, business

transfers as defined

and Senate Bill 2212, the
has been defined
title

with certain exclusions that are not
general.

to business

(See State Board of Equalization, No. 78/120,

tr&~sactions

in

ll' 1978.)

Leases of more than ten-year term qualify as property transfers under these
new rules.
As executives and their legal and tax advisors become more familiar
with the possibilities, there will no doubt be many ingenious solutions to
the problem of defining contracts to greatest mutual advantage of owner and
user.

Financing agencies are often deeply involved also in the determination

of the most advantageous treatment of business deals.
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The complications from Proposition 13 concerning the property-tax
liabilities of the Irvine Company and of the many owners in the major development of the city of Irvine in Orange County are considerable.
produced special problems:

Two factors

the widespread use of long-term land-lease

agreements in that development and the sale of controlling interest in the
Irvine Company in 1977.

It will be some time before the issues are finally

resolved.
Many commercial properties, in California and elsewhere, are occupied
by tenants on rental contracts that are "net" contracts.

The tenant agrees

to pay all utilities, insurance, and property taxes (and may, indeed, agree
to pay some other annual expenses).

The owner receives a net payment for

the use of the land (or land and structure) only.

Owners have often regarded

this as advantageous because it has protected them from the inflationary
cost increases of the past few years.

Now, with the passage of Proposition

13, there is a dramatic reversal of form:

the business

receives the

benefit of the reduction in property tax to a 1% ceiling and the reduction
to "base-year" treatment to the date the lease came into force.

Until the

lease term is up, the property owner cannot obtain a share of the cost
reduction; it goes as a windfall to the tenant.

If the owner of the property

were to sell it, however, the new rules of the game call for reassessment
at fair market value at the time of property transfer.

The larger windfall

is ordinarily the reduction of tax to the one-percent level, but owner
can threaten to inflict on tenant the loss of the base-year treatment.

With

this leverage, owner may be able to claim a share of the windfall immediately.
The greater possibility for capture of a large portion of the property-tax
reduction comes, of course, when the lease expires and is due for renegotiation.
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At this point, owner may take the position that lessor should be willing
to pay occupancy costs as high as were implicit in the earlier lease
agreement, including the effect of property taxes.

In this way, owner is

claiming a gain that in due course should mean capitalization of the tax
reduction into increased property value.
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Business Property Transaction Volume
While non-residential construction trends are measured and reported
regularly from permit data for each region of California, there is no
convenient source of regional or statewide data on business-property
transfer transactions.

The staff of the State Board of Equalization may soon

collect data on the volume of business-property transfers from county assessors.
To be useful for analytical purposes, total business-property transfers
would need to be broken into classes of business property:

industrial,

agricultural, extractive industries, office, commercial.
For example, the Real Estate Research Council of Northern California
uses quarterly totals of deed recordings in each
County Recorders, as a measure of real-estate-market
Northern California Real Estate Report, Vol.

, No. 5

, obtained from
(See
) ' pp. 23-24
the Recorder of

for an

Deeds and of the Tax Assessor--have data on file from which measures of
transaction volume in each property category could be constructed.
for maximum

But

of transfer data, the files of each county should
sification

so that aggregation and

comparisons could be undertaken.
County assessors do have new problems of identifying some business deals
that qualify as property transfers under Proposition 13 and the implementing
legislation.

In particular, business firms do not always need, from their

point of view, to record leases and contracts; yet any lease of ten-year
term or longer qualifies as a property transfer for the purposes of propertytax treatment under Proposition 13.

Assessors will probably use such clues

as utilities hook-ups and mail changes to trace such business transfers, as
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they already do for checking homeowner's tax exemption claims.

In addition,

the business-property statement that each business entity is required to
file will be expanded to include information on leases by having assessors
ask for direct reports in future from the business entities themselves on
the status of any lease on the property in question.
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Business Property Exclusions from Proposition 13 Treatment
The State Board of Equalization has authority under California statute
to undertake direct, statewide
property.

~ssessment

of

~ertain

types of business

These include the real property owned by regulated gas and electric

utility companies, telephone companies, and railroads.

Also, radio telephone

companies and some water companies fall under the State Board of Equalization's
direct jurisdiction, and so does the assessment of timber values.

The State

Board of Equalization has taken the position that Proposition 13 did not
case

cover these

and that it may continue to assess these regulated
Court

industries on the basis of current fair market values.
decision

the State Board of

other lit

may leave this issue unresolved for some years.

to gas, electric, and
tax

occur because of the

one

ion position, but appeals and

limit

utilities, if a reduction of
the base year and the
, the Publi

ded by

With

Utilities Commission

would undoubtedly take account of the cost reduction and order a
reduction of utility rates.

Thus, the chief effect of

the

regulated public utilities under Proposition 13 would be not to increase
their profits but to reduce utility rates and to reduce governmental tax
revenues.
State law already provides a special basis for evaluation of timber
in that tax payment is made at the time of timber harvest.

We cannot

attempt here to explore further the possible consequences of Proposition 13
on the forest-products industries.
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Effects of Proposition 13 upon Other Business Investment Decisions
Some business investment decisions have a large component classified
as real property, whereas others are concerned mainly with machinery and
equipment or with the
to be real property.

acqu~ition

of other productive assets not considered

general consequence of Proposition 13 is that the

real-property component of a business investment will now have a reduced
annual holding cost.

If no other changes of the cost and revenue elements

of the investment decision

occur~

this reduced holding cost will cause some

business investment possibilities that were previously rejected to become
attractive.
Some campaign arguments before Proposition 13 was passed claimed that
it would stimulate business investment in California.
necessary to be cautious about the consequences.

At this time, it is

As far as new factory

investment is concerned, most previous studies of industrial locational
decisions put the annual cost of property taxation low on the list of
considerations.

Access to markets, availability of labor, and quality of

local-government services (including the quality of schools) have been
found generally to be of greater importance to the locational decision.
Another type of business investment decision also illustrates the
current uncertainties.

Developers choose sites for planned regional shopping

centers on the basis of expected growth in the population of the regional
area and the concurrent development of road systems and other infrastructure
for residential communities.

While the post-Prgp6sition 13 property-tax

costs of a new regional-shopping-center complex would be lower than before,
and this cost reduction would make tke potential investment more attractive,
the rate of population growth of the area might be slowed by the increased
costs of the residential developer and by slower actions of local government

so
agencies in approving residential developments.

The sales-revenue potential

of a shopping-center development is a far more crucial variable in the
investment decision than is the annual cost of property taxes.
Thus, it will take further analysis, and the unfolding of new evidence
over a period of time, to determine the consequences of Proposition 13
for business investments.

OTHER I
13 1 s

upon

be

with

transfers need

to several

s

already discussed.

At the time of passage of
massive

assessors faced two

to trace the

each

assessed value of

and to send to each

the effect

tax

any transfer
on
believed that

tax bills would
that

correct.

ses

The
that

some cases,
been

In others,

said

assessors
value

be added to the
be added
In

the

of
asses

only those quali

needed
transfers

slat ion, and
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modify the assessed value to the fair market value at the time of the
transfer.

This is not a

because some transfers

mechanical

field work and other corroborat

information to identify.

County assessors did not have sufficient staff to undertake
simultaneously both of these tasks before issuing new "Prop. 13" assessed
values to taxpayers, and each county assessor chose how to deploy the
available staff.

The law apparently permits supplemental tax bills to be

rendered to taxpayers, based on corrected values, at any time up to several
years after the event.
assessment
of.
for both

It is likely to be a year or more before all of
from the passage of

are

In the meantime, there will remain some uncertainties
owners and homeowners.
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Appraisal Standards for Mortgage Financing
Mortgage underwriting for

hous

primary attention to the fair market value

f the

the time

f

mortgage application, but there is also some consideration of the owner's
income position and ability to cope with the costs of home ownership.
Reduction in property-tax payments eases these costs.

For this reason,

security analysts, evaluating the portfolio quality of

and loan

associations soon after passage of Proposition 13, offered the judgment that
existing mortgages were improved in soundness.
Appraisers of rental hous

for

financ

specific in analyzing the ability of the
loan.

purposes are very

to

the proposed

In the early months after passage of Proposition 13, however,

appraisal standards and formulas were not adjusted to take account of
the expected reduction in property-tax liability.

Instead, real-estate

appraisers continued to use the same multipliers as before in
the capital valuation of rental property.

Until the

assessors made

definitive determinations of assessed values, appraisers resisted
downward adjustments of property-tax payments.

Also, tenant groups, state

political leaders, and city councils began almost immediately to talk of
voluntary or compulsory rent rollbacks and possible rent control.

A rent

rollback approximately equal to the reduction in property-tax payment would
leave the owner of rental property in essentially the same net-income
position as before Proposition 13; and the conservative response of
appraisers might well be, therefore, to leave appraised values unadjusted
until the question of rent rollback became clarified.
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A Remedy Needed for the Lack of Downward Adjustability in Assessed Values
From the standpoint of its effects on rational decision-making, the
most glaring weakness of Proposition 13 is the lack of a-means for reducing
the assessed value of a property if its market value or its economic
productivity falls.

The owner-occupant of housing would be affected in the

event of severe deterioration in local real-estate values.

Also, if a home

purchased before 1975 is damaged by fire, flood, or other catastrophe and
must then be replaced at a much higher construction cost, the assessed
valuation would not be reduced when the loss occurred, but would be
increased at the current market valuation as of the time of the
ofbusiness property have specific needs for adjustment of
if value of property is reduced

assessed valuation and annual tax
by

loss or decline in productivity.

anomalous consequences in Section

We earlier discussed some

4.

, some remedy is needed for the lack of downward adjustability
of assessed value.
that under

The State Board of Equalization takes the position
law such downward adjustments cannot be made at the

discretion of the county assessor.

The constitutional status of

Proposition 13 appears to require that the remedy be another constitutional
amendment.
In the past, different local jurisdictions adopted policies of providing
from property-tax revenues differing mixes and qualities of educational
services; water, sewer, and other utilities; and other local services.
the costs of producing these services sometimes varied

~ccording

Also,

to the

relative efficiency of local governments and were affected py ecanamies or
diseconomies of scale in the production of governmental services.
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Proposition 13, at one stroke, eliminated the differentials in propertytax payments as related to governmental services.

Taxpayers could previously

choose between a higher-service and higher-cost community and a lower-service,
lower-cost community.

As local governments must now adjust to a new budgetary

reality in which revenues are much less subject to local decisions, these
options and choices will now be reduced.

Property taxpayers will not face

differences in tax liability from locality to locality for the costs of
local services.

In the long run, communities are likely to become more

similar in overall levels of service, though still differentiated in the
composition of services provided and in the effectiveness of local government.
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Concluding Comments About Proposition l3's Impacts on Real-estate Markets
The new conditions in the markets for both housing and nonhousing real
estate include not only an unequivocal, permanent reduction in the cost of
holding existing property, but also a series of other effects that are uncertain
in direction and magnitude.

The early response of decision-makers to this

uncertainty has, quite naturally, been to "go slow" in adjusting to the
new market conditions.
It appears that Proposition 13 imposes some penalty to an acknowledged
property transfer; thus, we may see more use of contracts of sale and of
unrecorded lease agreements, unless participants in real-estate markets
become convinced that county assessors can quickly find and deal with such
unrecorded transfers.

With the incentives for concealment, adequate

enforcement will require more resources in county assessors' offices.
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